ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, District Judge.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 ("Flight 11") and crashed it into 1 World Trade Center, the northern Twin Tower. As 1 World Trade Center collapsed, it spewed debris, some of which pierced the facade of 7 World Trade Center ("Tower 7"), causing fires and, eventually, Tower 7's collapse.
7 World Trade Company, L.P. ("7WTCo."), lessee of Tower 7, sued United Airlines, American Airlines and others (collectively, "Aviation Defendants"), alleging that Tower 7 would not have been destroyed but for Aviation Defendants' negligence. Aviation Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the basis that TWTCo.'s insurance recovery has fully compensated 7WTCo. for any possible tort recovery against Aviation Defendants.
Independent of that motion, two Aviation Defendants, United Continental Holdings, Inc. and United Airlines, Inc. (together, "United")', move for summary judgment on the basis that they bear no responsibility for Tower 7's destruction because they bear no responsibility for Flight 11 or its hijacking. For the reasons stated below, United's motion is granted.
On September 11, Portland International Jetport ("PWM") in Portland, Maine, had a single security screening checkpoint that screened all departing passengers, regardless of air carrier. "Th[e] checkpoint was under the custodial responsibility of Delta Air[Lines, which contracted for security screening services with Globe Aviation Services." The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Report on the Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security 3 (September 12, 2005) ("Staff Report"). On August 9, 2001, the air carriers participating in security screening at PWM, including United, executed a "Shared Responsibility Agreement," pursuant to which Delta Air Lines assumed responsibility "for the overall operation of the passenger security screening checkpoint ... for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of civil penalty actions, as well as to allocate the administrative and financial responsibility for any civil penalties levied by the Federal Aviation Administration." Delta Air Lines also assumed
In the early the morning of September 11, Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omani arrived at PWM, planning to take Colgan Air Flight 5930 ("Flight 5930") to Boston's Logan International Airport ("Logan"), where they planned to board Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles International Airport. At 5:43 a.m., they received their Flight 5930 boarding passes at the U.S. Airways ticket counter in the unsecure area of the PWM terminal.
Flight 5930 arrived at Gate B9(A) in Pier B of Terminal B at Logan at approximately 6:45 a.m. American Airlines Flight 11 was scheduled to depart at 7:45 a.m. from Gate 32 in Pier A of Terminal B. Piers A and B were separated by the Terminal B Parking Garage. Traveling from Gate B9(A) to Gate 32 required exiting both the secure and unsecure areas of Pier B, crossing the Terminal B Parking Garage, entering the unsecure area of Pier A, passing through a security screening checkpoint to enter the secure area of Pier A, and, finally, proceeding to Gate 32. See Staff Report at 3, 5.
Upon exiting Flight 5930, Atta and Omari followed this route to the unsecure area of Pier A. After obtaining their Flight 11 boarding passes from American Airlines, Atta and Omani entered a security screening checkpoint to access the secure area of Pier A. There were two such security screening checkpoints providing access to the secure area of Pier A, both operated by Globe Aviation Services under a contract with American Airlines. Staff Report 5; The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2 (2004) ("9/11 Commission Report"). United had no responsibility for either checkpoint; United's checkpoint and gates were in Terminal C of Logan Airport, a substantial distance removed from the American checkpoints and gates. Staff Report at 18. Atta and Omari each passed through one of these checkpoints before boarding Flight 11,
At approximately 8:15 a.m., the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. At 8:46 a.m., Flight 11 crashed into the upper stories of I World Trade Center. The 110-story structure collapsed at 10:28 a.m., spewing flaming debris as it fell. The debris, expelled to the north, pierced the facade of Tower 7, starting fires inside the building. The fires burned unchecked, and at 5:21 p.m., Tower 7 collapsed.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Overton v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir.2004), and must "resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2004).
7WTCo brought this action pursuant to the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note et seq. ("ATSSSA"), which creates a federal cause of action for damages arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11. ATSSSA provides the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with original and exclusive jurisdiction over such actions, with the substantive law to be "derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law." Under New York choice of law rules, the state in which a tort occurred has the strongest interest in applying its conduct-regulating rules. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985). As neither party has shown New York law to be inconsistent with or preempted by federal law, New York law governs the issue of duty with respect to the crash of Flight 11 and the destruction of Tower 7. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F.Supp.2d 279, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y.2003).
"To establish a prima facie case of negligence under New York law, `a
"[T]he existence of a duty is an issue of law for the courts," while "whether a particular defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff is a question of fact." Kimmell v. Schaefer, 89 N.Y.2d 257, 263, 652 N.Y.S.2d 715, 675 N.E.2d 450 (1996); Alfaro, 210 F.3d at 114. In determining the existence of a duty, "not only logic and science, but policy play an important role. The common law of torts is, at its foundation, a means of apportioning risks and allocating the burden of loss. While moral and logical judgments are significant components of the analysis, we are also bound to consider the larger social consequences of our decisions and to tailor our notion of duty so that the legal consequences of wrongs are limited to a controllable degree." Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, 229, 513 N.Y.S.2d 356, 505 N.E.2d 922 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Identifying the scope of an alleged tortfeasor's duty is not something derived or discerned from an algebraic formula. Rather, it coalesces from vectored forces including logic, science, weighty competing socioeconomic policies and sometimes contractual assumptions of responsibility. New York courts fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of liability." Alfaro, 210 F.3d at 114 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The New York Court of Appeals has expressed concern regarding "the unfairness of imposing liability for the acts of another" and the "potentially limitless liability" that may result.
The basis of 7WTCo.'s negligence claim against United is 7WTCo.'s contention that "United had a legal duty and a clear chance to prevent the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 when Atta and his accomplice passed through the Portland security checkpoint for which United had shared responsibility."
I begin with "[t]he threshold question in any negligence action," namely "does defendant owe a legally recognized duty of care to plaintiff?" Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 232, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055. In the present case, the question is whether United owed 7WTCo. a duty of care. 7WTCo. contends that United had such a duty, relying on Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 89 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.1996).
In Stanford, four Hezbollah terrorists, on December 3,1984, boarded Middle East Airlines ("MEA") Flight 426 ("Flight 426") in Beirut, Lebanon, bound for Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Arriving in Dubai, the terrorists boarded Kuwait Airways Flight 221 ("Flight 221"), bound for Karachi, Pakistan. Among the passengers on Flight 221 were three United States diplomats. After takeoff, the terrorists hijacked the aircraft and forced the pilot to fly to Tehran, Iran. Once the aircraft reached Terhran, the terrorists held the diplomats and an additional American passenger hostage, tortured all four, and murdered two of the diplomats.
The surviving diplomat and the estates of the two deceased diplomats sued MEA, alleging that the injuries and deaths would not have occurred but for MEA's negligence. The trial court found that MEA owed no duty to the diplomats and granted MEA judgment as a matter of law. Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 892 F.Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Upon the plaintiffs' appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that while it was a "close call," "MEA was not so far removed from the actions aboard the ill-fated Kuwait Airways flight as to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law," and reversed the trial court's decision. Stanford, 89 F.3d at 127-28. Stanford's unique facts, however, distinguish it from the present case.
Other than sharing residual authority for the PWM security screening checkpoint, United had no connection to Flight 11 or its hijackers. In Stanford, MEA's connection to the hijackers was direct and significant. Beyond MEA's operation of Flight 426, "MEA's employees at the Beirut airport were responsible for selling and examining passengers' tickets, checking the information on the tickets against visas and passports, and receiving baggage from the passengers. These employees were the first line of defense between hijackers, and innocent passengers aboard MEA and connecting flights." Id. at 120. MEA's ticketing role is especially significant:
Id. at 121.
Furthermore, "MEA, Kuwait Airways, and other [airlines] participated in a program of `interline' ticketing, a reciprocal arrangement whereby a single ticket written by one airline for a flight on that airline [would] also accommodate the same passenger's flight on a second airline with the revenues to be allocated pro tanto between the airlines. Because of interline ticketing, MEA in fact issued the hijackers their tickets to the flight that they hijacked.
Also, MEA knew that the poor security at the Beirut airport could lead hijackers to board a flight at Beirut intending to hijack a connecting flight at a second airport. MEA "knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care should have known" of a warning issued in 1983 by the Security Advisory Committee of the International Air Transport Association, of which MEA was a member, that "terrorists would board airlines at airports with poor security, and transfer to target airlines at other airports with tighter security." Id. at 120, 124. Even fully crediting 7WTCo,'s allegations, however, the circumstances in the present case are not analogous.
As the Second Circuit put it, Stanford was a "close call," at the outer limits of notions of duty. Its facts are plainly distinguishable from the present case and it does not persuade me that a defendant situated like United owes a duty of care to a plaintiff situated like 7WTCo.
In deciding whether such a duty of care should be found, I must heed the New York Court of Appeals' caution regarding the extension of liability to defendants for their failure to control the conduct of others in light of the potential for unfairness and potentially limitless liability. Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 232-33, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055. As Chief Judge Cardozo famously wrote, "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. 99. It was not within United's range of apprehension that terrorists would slip through the PWM security screening checkpoint, fly to Logan, proceed through another air carrier's security screening and board that air carrier's flight, hijack the flight and crash it into 1 World Trade Center, let alone that 1 World Trade Center would therefore collapse and cause Tower 7 to collapse.
For these reasons, I rule that United did not owe 7WTCo. a duty of care.
For the reasons discussed above, United's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk shall mark the motion (Doc. No. 187) terminated and enter judgment dismissing Defendants United Continental Holdings, Inc. and United Airlines, Inc, from the case. Costs shall be taxed by the Clerk.
SO ORDERED.